[164]
Social Democrats * want to retain the concept of "rights" for "human rights" such as freedom of speech for example, but refuse to apply to private property [165] . Yet the concept of rights is only meaningful if we hear them as Property Rights. For not only is there no human rights that are at the same time property rights, but human rights lose their precise and absolute when they are not based on the criterion of property rights.
Let us assume that property rights are identical to the human rights of two ways: first, that there men to own property, so that their rights on Property rights are human beings and secondly, Law the person's own body, personal freedom, is a property right in his own person as well as a "Human Right". But what is most important for our present is that human rights, they are not formulated in terms of property rights, appear vague and contradictory, leading the Socialists to mitigate the name of "public policy" or "general interest". Allow me to quote what I wrote in another book:
"Take for example the 'Law rights' of freedom of expression. It is assumed that freedom of speech means the right of everyone to say what he wants. But it ignores the question of where. Where a man did this right? Certainly not on a property where he entered without permission. In other words, he has this law on its own property or the property has consented to receive it, either free or under a lease. In fact, there is no particular right 'to freedom of expression' it is the Right General property which is the right of a man do what he likes with his property and sign voluntary contracts with other owners " [166] .
short, there is no" right to freedom of expression "this that we have is the right to rent a room and talk to people who cross the threshold. There is no "right to freedom of the press" what we have is the right to write and publish writing, and to sell to whomever is willing to buy (or to distribute it free to those who accept it). Thus, in each case, the rights held by the person are property rights which include freedom of contract and freedom to sell his property. There is no "right to" freedom of expression or freedom of the press in addition General rights to property that is available.
Moreover, the very concept of law is weakened by the confusion that surrounds an analysis formulated in terms of "Right to freedom of expression" rather than in terms of property rights. J. Holmes has provided an illustration famous person, he said, has the right shouting "Fire!" without reason in a crowded theater whence it follows that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute but must be tempered by considerations of "public order" [167] . But if we analyze the issue in terms of property rights, we will see that there is nothing that justifies to weaken the absolute nature of these rights [168] .
Logically, indeed, he who uttered the cry is either a customer or the owner of the theater. If the owner is, he violated the Right of his clients hold on the quiet enjoyment of the show, for which he got paid. If a client is crying, it violates both the right of ownership of other clients on the show and the Owner's right because it does not meet the conditions for its presence in places, which include certainly respect the rights of the owner by not disturb the spectacle it presents. One way or another, therefore, the troublemaker is liable to prosecution for violation of the law of property and the fact we focus our attention on the property rights involved shows that the difficulty suggested by Holmes does not require that the law mutilates the absolute nature of rights.
In a biting criticism the argument Holmes on one crying "fire" in a crowded theater, JA Hugo. iB.Black, , well known for his absolutist conception of freedom of expression, has shown how it is rooted in private property rights. He wrote:
"I went to the theater with you last night. I feel like if you and I were raised to wander in the room during the show, we would have been arrested. Nobody ever argued that the First Amendment ** gives people the right to go wherever they want in the world and say anything. Purchase theater tickets do not confer the right to make a speech. We have a system of ownership in this country, which is also protected by the Constitution. It implies that man has no right to do whatever they want anywhere. For example, I would not feel very sympathetic to someone who claims to come in my house arguing his constitutional right to make a speech against the Supreme Court. I know that people are free to make speeches against the Supreme Court, but I do not want either in my house. "
"It's a nice formula that history yelling 'fire' in a crowded theater. But you do not have to yell 'fire' to be arrested. If someone disturbs the peace of the theater, he will be arrested not for content of what he yelled but the simple fact have screamed. It will be apprehended, not to Because of his views but because it believes he has nothing to say that we want to hear that place. That would be my answer: not because what he shouted but because he screamed " [169] .
In the sixties, the French political theorist Bertrand de Jouvenel had argued that limits on freedom of expression and the right to assemble were necessary because of what he called the" problem of the president meeting ": how to allocate the time allowed or space in a meeting in a newspaper or on the air when the stakeholders believe they have a "right" to freedom of expression that involves the use of the resource in question [170] . But what Jouvenel has not seen, is precisely the solution we propose the problem of the chairman, who is to reformulate the concept of rights in terms of private property rather than in terms of freedom of expression or freedom to assemble.
First, note how each of the examples of Jouvenel - participants in a meeting, the one who sends an article to the editor, or whoever wants to participate in a radio - refers to a situation where the scarce resource, time or space, is offered free, without a price is asked. This raises what economists call "the problem of rationing". The use of a scarce resource must be shared and useful, whether it's time to speak to the desk of the speaker, airtime or space in a newspaper. When the resource is free when it costs nothing, the demand for time or space will necessarily be very excess of supply, whereby the consciousness of a "shortage" is inevitable. As is always the case when the prices are too low or nonexistent cause shortages and queues, consumers whose applications remains unsatisfied feel frustrated and irritated at not having access to resources on which they believe they have a "right".
a scarce resource whose use is not distributed by the procedure of price must be rationed in some other way by his owner. Moreover, in the examples de Jouvenel, prices could well provide the rationing if the owners wanted. The Presiding Officer may be auctioned speaking time at the podium and give to the highest bidder. The producer of a radio could do the same thing. (This is well the rest are chains that when selling airtime to advertisers individuals). So, shortages would disappear and with them the feelings of frustration at the false promise of "equal access" to the newspaper, at the podium, with the antenna ...
The fundamental fact is that in all cases, the owner must necessarily allocate the use of its resources, whether by prices or otherwise. The owner of the program or radio (or his agent) rents or gives airtime to his liking. The owner the newspaper or its editor distributes space correspondents at his pleasure. The "owner" of the Assembly or its representative, the President distributes the time to speak as he pleases.
The fact that ownership is the ultimate key distribution provides the solution to Jouvenel. Indeed, he who sends a letter to the mail reader does not own the newspaper and therefore did not Right to be published, it can only make a request that the owner has the absolute right to reject or satisfy. Whoever wishes to speak at a meeting no law, it makes only a claim on which the owner or his agent will decide. The solution is to give the "right to freedom of expression" or "right to assemble" a new meaning-based private property rights rather than the vague idea and, as Jouvenel demonstrates, non-operational for any "equal right to " time or space. Only when it is designed as a simple case of property law that the "Right to freedom of expression" found its valid character, operational and absolute.
This is clearly seen in this "right to canvass the people" as proposed Jouvenel. There, he writes, "a sense in which freedom of expression can be exercised by everyone: the" Right Approach ", that is to say to approach people, to try to convince them, then put them together in one room and, thus, to 'constitute a meeting. " There Jouvenel. the solution is close but not to see it. Does not he say that to be valid and operational, the "Right to freedom of expression" is solved in the Right talk to people, trying to convince them to rent a room to talk to those who choose to come, etc.. ? However, in this sense then, freedom of expression is only part of the general law that a person has on his property. ( Provided, obviously not ignore the law not be bothered to who do not want short, the law does not listen). Because the property right includes the right to use his own property and conclude contracts and exchange of mutual agreement with other owners. The "seller" jouvenélien who rents a meeting room and speaks to its assistance does not wave a "free speech" but an integral part of its general right to property. Jouvenel says almost when he staged his two protagonists, Primus and Secundus:
"Primus [...] has struggled to bring his audience. Here are a foreigner, Secundus, and sometimes on behalf of the needs of freedom of expression, claims the right to speak at this meeting. Primus Must give him the platform? I doubt it. He can answer Secundus: 'It was I who made the meeting. You can go and do the same thing. "
Exactly. In other words, Primus owner of the assembly, he rented the room, called the meeting and established the rules and those who do not like these conditions are free not to attend or leave. Primus has a property right that allows him to speak whenever he wants, Secundus, having no Title to the meeting, nor has any "right to speak."
More generally, there the weakening of Rights where the property is poorly localized, where property rights are scrambled. The problems of freedom of expression, for example, are rampant in the streets that belong to the people of the state: the government need to allow political demonstrations which he claims they will impede the movement and spread leaflets on the floor ? These problems seem to challenge the supremacy of freedom of expression are in fact solely due to the failure to delineate property rights. Because the streets in general belong men of the State, which are then in the position of chairman. Like any owner, they are faced with the problem of allocating their scarce resources. Suppose that the street demonstrations should cause a traffic jam, so the decision of the state of men is not so much a question of freedom of expression just a matter of allocating the street by its owner.
Note that no problem would arise if the streets were privately owned and private enterprises - which would be true of all streets in a libertarian society - because then, like any other privately owned, the streets could be rented or loaned to individuals or private groups wishing to organize events. In a purely libertarian society, there would be no more "right" to use the street someone that divert the meeting room of others in each case, the only is Right a property right, consisting of leasing the necessary resource with his money, if indeed the owner consents. Sure, as long as the streets remain state property, the dispute remains unsolved, because this scheme involves all our other property rights, including freedom of expression, to assemble, distribute leaflets, etc.. will be hampered and limited by the need for continual and borrow through the streets of men belonging to the State and that they may decide to close or limit the use of all sorts of ways. If the government allows the demonstration in the street, it will restrict circulation and if allowed the event to maintain a smooth flow, it will limit the freedom of access to its streets. One way or another, whatever the decision, the "Rights" of certain taxpayers to taper off.
The other place where the vagueness of rights and the uncertain location of the property create intractable conflicts is in the state assemblies (and their "presidents"). As we noted in fact, when a man or a group renting a room and appoint a chairman, you see immediately where the property is located and Primus wins. But what about a meeting state? Who she belongs? Nobody really knows, so it is not satisfactory and non-arbitrarily decide who speaks and who does not speak, what is decided and what will not be. It is true that the State Assembly is organized by its own rules, but what happens if they do not obtain the consent of a significant proportion of citizens? We can not find a satisfactory answer because the location of the property is not clear. In other words, when we consider a newspaper or a radio, it is clear that the author of the letter and the participant potential applicants are, and that the director or the director are the owners who makes the decision. In the case of an assembly state, we do not know who owns it. The man who wishes to speak at a meeting of municipal claims to a status of co-owner but he has not established any ownership or by purchase or by inheritance or by the discovery, as is done in all other areas.
Returning to the issue of street where other vexing problems arise which would be quickly resolved in a society libertarian, because everything is clearly marked private property. Thus, in the current system, a perpetual conflict between the "law" of taxpayers who want access to streets belonging to the men of the state and the willingness of residents to clean their streets of items they consider "undesirables". In several neighborhoods in New York, for example, we see events almost hysterical residents who oppose the installation of McDonald, whose use of power by local authorities for these purposes is often successful. This Obviously there are violations characterized the Ownership of MacDonald on property she bought. But residents still have a few arguments: the accumulation of rubbish and the arrival of individuals "undesirable" attracted by the restaurant and who will gather around, that is to say in the streets. In short, what, at bottom, residents are attacking, it's not so much Ownership McDonald at what they consider a "bad" use of streets nationalized. Their complaint is basically the "Human rights" that allow some people to borrow their way to the streets monopolized by men of the State. But as taxpayers and citizens, "undesirables" also have the "right" to walk down the street, and they have also not need a McDonald's to get together wherever they want. In the libertarian society, where all the streets are private, the conflict would shrink without affecting the property rights of anyone else: they are the owners of streets who have the right to choose who will have access and they could by therefore prevent at will the arrival of "unwanted " .
Obviously, the owners of streets that would choose to exclude "undesirable elements" should pay the price: police surveillance would cost more, attendance at street shops would be affected and the movement of guests riparian hampered. From all this undoubtedly result in a free society, diverse configuration of access rules, certain streets (and the neighborhoods bounded by them) are open to all, others imposing various forms of restrictions.
Similarly, the problem of "right" of free immigration rights would be resolved by a regime where roads and streets are private. There is no doubt that the current barriers to restrict immigration, not so much the "law of immigration" that the right of owners to rent or sell. To immigrants what they have in their possession. There can be no Law of man at immigration because it would mean the right to enter a property, but property who ? If Primus wants to immigrate to the United States, we can not claim he has the absolute right to come anywhere since we must take into account the current owners who do not want him home. On the other hand, it can exist and there are certainly other owners who would jump at the chance to rent or sell a property to Primus, and current laws that prevent them to do so violates their property rights to them.
whole immigration problem would be solved in the matrix of absolute property rights characteristics of the society libertarian. Because people have the right to move on properties and land that current owners are willing to rent them or sell them. In a free society, people have the right to travel only on routes which the owners would use them and then rent or buy their homes from owners consented. As in the case of traffic in the streets, there would undoubtedly reveal a diverse and varied configuration of immigration rules.
[164] see the reasoning in Rothbard, Power and Market , pp. 238-240. See also Rothbard, For a New Liberty , pp. 42-44.
* The author here uses the term "liberals" who, in the American sense, is closer to "social democratic" than the French term "liberal"; It means the "liberals" within the meaning of the nineteenth century English by "classical liberal" or more often (to criticize) by free-market "or" laissez faire ". The French liberals of the nineteenth century, to the extent they are more consistent, are for him" Libertarians " This is the case of Dupont de Nemours, Destutt de Tracy, Jean-Baptiste Say, Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer, Augustin Thierry, Frédéric Bastiat, Gustave de Molinari, Edmond About, Yves Guyot, etc.. It is also true "liberal" American associated with the American Revolution or related to the French tradition. Generally, we translated the "liberal" the U.S. "Social Democrat", "Left" or "socialist". [NDT]
[165] A particularly clear example of contradiction is Prof. Peter Singer, who called explicitly to keep the concept of rights to personal liberty, while pouring in utilitarianism in economic affairs and in the property field. Peter Singer, "The Right to Be Rich Gold Poor”, New York Review of Books, 6 mars 1975.
[166] Rothbard, Power and Market, pp. 238-239.
[167] Sur la citation de Holmes, cf. Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pp. 43-44 ; et Power and Market, pp. 239-240. For a final review of its reputation of Holmes as a civil libertarian, cf. Mencken Chrestomathy , pp. 258-64.
[168] Moreover, the idea that yelling "fire" in case panic itself is deterministic. this is just another variant of the myth involved in "incitement to riot" denounced above. It is for people who are in the room to judge the information that reaches them. If this was not the case, why does warn against a true fire would it not be punished, since he can also create a panic? The disturbance caused by yelling "fire" is a cause of action that under the violation of property rights described in the text below. I owe this remark to Professor David Gordon.
** First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is also the first article of the Bill of Rights protects freedom of expression. [translator's note]
[169] Dillird Irving, ed. One Man's Stand for Freedom, New York: Knopf, 1963, pp. 477-78.
Murray Rothbard in The Ethics of freedom
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